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Summary	
More than 30 years have passed since the Voyager 2 fly-bys of Uranus and Neptune. I discuss a range of 
lessons learned from Voyager, broadly grouped into “process, planning, and people.” In terms of process, we 
must be open to new concepts: reliance on existing instrument technologies, propulsion systems, and 
operational modes is inherently limiting. I cite examples during recent decades that could open new vistas in 
exploration of the deep outer Solar System. Planning is crucial: mission gaps that last over three decades leave 
much scope for evolution both in mission development and in the targets themselves. I touch only briefly on 
planetary science, as that is covered in other papers in this issue, but the role of the decadal surveys will be 
examined in this section. I also sketch out how coordination of distinct and divergent international planning 
timelines yields both challenges and opportunity. Finally, I turn to people: with generational-length gaps 
between missions, continuity in knowledge and skills requires careful attention to people. The youngest 
participants in the Voyager missions (myself included) now approach retirement. We share here ideas for 
preparing the next generation of voyagers. Setting	the	Stage	
In this paper, I review lessons I’ve gleaned in over 30 years of working in the fields of astrophysics and 
planetary science (particularly outer planets). In February 1988, with the ink barely dry on my Ph.D. thesis 
about the clouds of Neptune, I joined the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in a post-doctoral position. As one of 
the last scientists added to the Voyager team during the formal planetary encounter phase, my job as a 
member of the Imaging Science Subsystem team entailed analysis of images coming from Voyager 2 during 
the cruise phase approach to Neptune. For one and a half years I worked with team members to assess the 
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incoming Neptune atmospheric data; identify and analyze cloud features; and collaborate with spacecraft 
specialists to plan for the August 1989 flyby. 
One of the greatest disappointments of my science career is that I missed the actual Voyager Neptune flyby 
itself in 1989. Instead of experiencing the excitement at JPL, I was deployed to the remote 14,000-ft (4,000-m) 
summit of Maunakea, tasked with obtaining ground-based imaging of Neptune to serve as ground truth for 
the Voyager images. It was heart-breaking to work on Voyager Neptune data right up until just days before 
the fly-by… and then leave. But the data were important – allowing us to link the detailed spacecraft images 
to past and future telescopic observations from Earth-based facilities – so leave I did. 
I spent the subsequent decades delving through the Voyager data and also exploring Neptune and its 
fraternal twin Uranus with the most advanced telescopic facilities available, including the Hubble Space 
Telescope, the Gemini Observatory, and the Keck 10-m telescope. I’ve also spent more than two decades 
working in the field of astrophysics, serving as an Interdisciplinary Scientist for the James Webb Space 
Telescope. My goals for that observatory are not only studies of Uranus and Neptune, but also observations of 
many other objects within our Solar System. During the past ten years, I’ve moved from science to science 
management and facilitation, based in Washington DC. These latter decades serve to inform many of the 
lessons in this paper. 
Before delving into specific lessons below, I want to share 
two overarching lessons which I will return to throughout 
this paper. First is a lesson from the past that bears 
repeating.  This “Lesson 0” comes from none other than 
Michelangelo (Fig. 1). One of his more profound and 
cautionary sayings has direct relevance to those of us who 
seek to explore the most distant and inaccessible objects: 
“The greatest danger for most of us is not that our aim is 
too high and we miss it, but that it is too low and we reach 
it." I urge my colleagues to aim high, rather than low. At 
the scale in which most of us aspire to work, exciting ideas 
and missions drive budgets, not the other way around. 
The other overarching lesson is gleaned from years of 
work within Washington DC, which I will call Lesson 1 
(Fig. 2): “When your mission costs above $1B, science is 
necessary but not sufficient.” There is nothing definitive 
about “$1B” but experience has consistently shown that 
once you reach this level of visibility within the U.S. 
civilian science environment, other considerations become 
relevant. And the higher the cost of a mission, the more 
important those other considerations become. 
 
Fig. 1. Michelangelo. Though perhaps best 
known as a sculptor and painter, 
Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni 
was also an architect and a poet. Credit: 
Credit: Daniele da Volterra, Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, online collection (The Met 
object ID 436771) 
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Lesson 1 is difficult for scientists to 
appreciate. Scientists are driven by 
scientific research and our decadal surveys 
are science-focused. Yet within the world 
of politics, science is but one factor. If 
planetary scientists want to someday send 
a flagship mission to an Ice Giant, the 
essential requirements of Lessons 0 and 1 
must be the mantras for getting it there. 
Successful mission advocates are always 
cognizant of the real landscape of funding 
and politics, and position missions 
accordingly. Process	
Planetary scientists often focus solely on the science return from a mission. Science is indeed essential and is 
the topic of many of the companion papers in this issue.  However, see Fig. 2: what other lessons external to 
science might we consider? In this section I discuss aspects of the “process” of missions and how they are 
executed, both in terms of the functional hardware and in terms of the management structures that give rise to 
the finished mission. 
One evergreen lesson is to be open to new technologies. The London Ice Giants meeting featured speakers 
with a remarkable array of technological expertise (see companion papers in the issue). This technology is 
important not only because of the science it enables, but because the companies and industries that support 
this development can be powerful allies in advocating for a future mission (Fig. 2).  Ice giant missions are in a 
particular bind, though, because of the multi-decadal timescales required for completion. When only one 
mission is launched every thirty years, planners are unwilling to take risks on innovation. (That said, 
technology has advanced so much in the thirty-plus years since Voyager that, for an Ice Giant mission, even 
older low-risk technology is far advanced beyond that of the Voyager era.) . 
A second but less obvious lesson is to be open to innovative development processes championed by key 
individuals within Agencies or by industry. One experiment from the past illustrates this lesson: the Cassini 
Resource Exchange. This innovative process managed the development of the Cassini Spacecraft science 
payload (Fig. 3). A “market-based” economic system, it permitted the varied instrument teams to “trade 
resources” rather than being limited to a fixed allocation [1]. Initially, the tradable “commodities” in the 
Cassini Resource Exchange were data rate, budget, mass, and power.  Later, cost was added to help with 
phasing issues. In the end, the program was able to build and deliver all of the proposed science instruments 
on time, the overall cost of the science payload grew by less than 1%, and as a bonus, the science payload mass 
 
Fig. 2. A crucial lesson for large missions. My colleagues and 
I distilled this amalgam from conversations with leaders of 
several large (multi-billion-dollar) science projects. This was 
first experienced with the Hubble Space Telescope, which is 
now recognized as the most scientifically -productive space 
mission ever launched despite a rocky development and an 
ignominious start. 
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actually shrank by 7%. Since a future flagship to an Ice Giant will likely have a complex and multi-faceted 
science payload, it might be worth revisiting a similar development process.  
Thirdly, planetary science does not 
operate in a vacuum. As of this 
writing, the US astrophysics 
community is deeply engaged in their 
decadal survey planning process. As a 
part of that activity, NASA 
commissioned four major flagship 
studies (collected at 
greatobservatories.org), and a 
significant effort has gone into 
assessing the process aspects of major 
(high-cost and high-complexity) 
missions.  
Table 1 (extracted from the LUVOIR 
mission presentation to the 
Astrophysics Decadal Survey [2]) 
illustrates a selection of papers that 
focus specifically on the issue of cost- 
and schedule-management for large 
NASA missions. The papers span 
astrophysics and planetary science as 
well as the US Department of Defense 
and the US Navy. The lessons in these 
documents have general applicability 
and are certainly relevant to Ice Giant 
missions (see Fig. 2).  
When considering process for operating missions, consider alternative modes of operations.  The New 
Horizons team implemented a “sleep” mode during the long cruise phases of the mission, when instruments 
were shut down and staff were reduced to skeleton crews.  An alternative tactic for long cruise phases is to 
partner with outside groups to conduct ancillary science; e.g., conduct observations of transiting exoplanets, 
or make measurements of heliospheric conditions.  Partnerships must be very carefully crafted, however, to 
avoid “scope creep” in the fundamental mission science in order to contain cost and maintain schedule.   
Last but not least, it is highly advantageous for mission teams to engage early and often with industry 
counterparts. Avoid waiting until NASA has defined mission criteria or puts out a call; rather reach out to 
potential partners very early in the development process. While some may advocate for mission development 
 
Fig. 3.  Cassini Mission to Saturn. The Cassini program used an 
innovative “resource Exchange” to facilitate the development of 
its science payload. Image source: 
https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/basics/cassini/. 
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to be focused within NASA Centers, there are significant advantages to having a broader base of support for a 
mission concept even in its earliest stages (see Fig. 2). 
 Planning	
One of the most salient aspects of Ice Giant missions is multi-decadal timescales. This extended timeframe 
affects all aspects of mission planning and development, from science, to mission structure, to development 
cycles, and more (including people, but I defer that discussion to the next section). Here I touch on a few of 
these aspects, but this is not an exhaustive assessment. 
Table 1 
Research* on strategies for change in cost- and schedule-efficient project management 
† Bitten, R., et al., 2019, Challenges and Potential Solutions to Develop and Fund NASA Flagship 
Missions, IEEE, 978-1-5386-6854-2/19  
  Wiseman, J., 2015, The Hubble Space Telescope at 25: Lessons Learned for Future Missions, 
IAUGA 2258532W 
  Mitchell, D., 2015, An Overview of NASA Project Management, MAVEN Magic, and Lessons 
Learned 
  Martin, P., 2012, NASA’s Challenges to Meeting Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals, OIG 
Report IG-12-021 
† Feinberg, L., Arenberg, J., et al., 2018, Breaking the Cost Curve: Applying Lessons Learned from 
the JWST Development to Build More Cost Effective Large Space Telescopes in the Future, SPIE 
10698-23.    
  Arenberg, J., Matthews, G., et al., 2014, Lessons We Learned Designing and Building the Chandra 
Telescope, SPIE 9144-25 
  CRS 2007,  Defense Procurement 2004-2007: Full Funding Policy – Background, Issues, and Options 
for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, RL31404 
  O’Rourke, R., 2006, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches – Background and 
Options for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, RL32776 
* = References {3} – {10];     † = Highly recommended reading 
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Science, by definition, is the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world 
through observation and experiment.  For our two local Ice Giants, we are scientifically stymied because the 
Voyager flybys in the 1980s remain our only brief close-up assessments of each system, and the 
instrumentation was limited in comparison with today’s capabilities. Furthermore, these systems are so 
distant that the most powerful telescopes on Earth and in space are required to study their most basic aspects. 
Those telescopes are in high demand by other users, resulting in extremely limited time for Ice Giant research.  
That said, nearly everything we know about these systems has changed since those brief Voyager encounters 
more than 30 years ago. The science results at the London Ice Giants Conference (see companion articles) are a 
testament to the perseverance and perspicacity of my colleagues, who have pushed and planned to the very 
frontiers of astronomical instrumentation to glean this new knowledge.  
Decadal	Surveys	
The actual process of planning missions in the United States is rooted in our “decadal survey” process run by 
the US National Academy of Sciences (Fig. 4). For two decades now, an ice giant mission has been highly 
ranked in our planetary decadal surveys. However, NASA’s science budget is finite, and generally only one or 
at most two major (flagship) missions are initiated in each decade. To date, Ice Giants missions have not yet 
  
Fig. 4. Recent US Planetary Decadal Surveys. Ice giant system missions were highly ranked in each 
of these documents (2003 [11] and 2013 [12]), but other factors (e.g., programmatic, political) 
precluded their implementation (see Fig. 2). 
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made the cut.1 In order to move forward, it is imperative that an Ice Giant System mission be the top-ranked 
flagship class mission in the next planetary decadal (see Fig. 2).  
Past decadal surveys, and past arguments about why to return to this or that planet, are often location-based 
(Fig. 5). For example, “we’ve done orbiters at planets X and Y, now it is time for Neptune,” or “we’ve already 
done Z missions to that inner Solar System planet, let’s go to Uranus instead.” Our decadal surveys have 
encouraged that type of thinking through their very structure, with panels being focused on targets (Venus, or 
Mars, or Giant Planets). I am not convinced this “destination” thinking is scientifically sound anymore; as 
discussed in the next section, a broader scientific perspective is needed. 
 
Fig. 5. Schematic of Solar System missions. Charts like this encourage a destination-based ethos. Source: 
Pop Chart https://popchart.co/products/the-chart-of-cosmic-exploration 
Diversity	of	Worlds	
Planetary science today has exploded with the confirmation of thousands of planets around other stars (Fig. 
6). These “exoplanets” have not only been detected, but assessments are now beginning of their bulk 
properties, atmospheres, phase curves, and other measurements (see [13,14]). 
It is fair to say that the theoretical models for understanding exoplanets currently outstrip the available 
knowledge to date. A more robust scientific planning process will put our Solar System bodies solidly within 
the context of all planets.  We could then ask a very different type of questions. What can greater knowledge 
about the objects in our Solar System uniquely contribute to our understanding of planetary science writ 
 
1 As of this writing, NASA announced selections for its Discovery line. In an exciting development, the Trident mission 
was selected. Trident’s science, however, is narrowly focused on Neptune’s moon Triton, with little room to add 
science relevant to other aspects of the Neptune system without breaking cost and schedule caps, leaving out 
crucial data such on Neptune’s atmosphere, interior, magnetic field, Neptune’s complex and evolving ring system, 
and other moons. 
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large? What local measurements are crucial 
for refining theories for all planetary 
systems?  What does the field of exoplanets 
tell us about planets in general, and what 
ground truths can missions to our local 
planets in turn provide? 
A number of talks at the London Ice Giants 
conference explicitly addressed this issue of 
Ice Giants in the context of exoplanets (e.g., 
[13]). If our next US planetary decadal is 
mindful of the broad scope of planetary 
science, and ensures that its 
recommendations are relevant and useful to 
those who study planetary systems 
elsewhere, then a comprehensive Ice Giant 
mission could very well rise to the top-
ranked position. Its science yield per dollar 
would far outstrip many (if not all) other 
missions (see also Fig. 2). In the past decadal 
survey, a Uranus mission surprised many by 
rising to an extremely high rank on exactly 
this criterion. 
Actual	Mission	Funding	Process	
Many US scientists assume that if a mission 
is top-ranked in a decadal survey, then it is time to celebrate! In reality the process is far more multi-faceted: 
remember Lesson 1! Within the United States, the federal funding process is complex. The power of the purse 
formally resides in the U.S. Congress and (almost more importantly for science) in key Congressional 
committees. The Executive branch of the US government (including the President’s administration and 
funding agencies such as NASA) nevertheless exerts strong influences on funding priorities (“the President 
proposes, the Congress disposes”). In addition to this inherent “push and pull” tension in government 
activities, there are many external influences as well (see Figure 7). It is not usual for a scientist to be asked by 
a Congressional staffer: “Why is your multi-billion-dollar space mission more important to my state than the 
federal facility that Agency X is proposing to build there?” Scientific priority and prowess, while necessary, 
are far from sufficient for success (see Fig. 2, again).  
 
Fig. 6. Planets galore. This poster illustrates of the diversity 
of planets both within our Solar System and around other 
stars. Visualization by Martin Vargic. 
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Fig. 7. The US federal funding process. This cartoon illustrates some factors at play in determining US 
budgets. A top-ranked mission in the decadal survey (icon in lower left) does not instantly translate 
into funding for a NASA mission ($ in lower right), as many diverse constituents make their needs 
known. The small fonts of the US Decadal Survey and NASA (in yellow) allude to their relative 
importance in the grand scheme of US federal budgets. Modified from an image by Matt Mountain 
(AURA), and used with permission. 
My experience is limited with the funding processes in other countries, but I suspect that the fundamental 
premise of Fig. 2 (science is necessary but not sufficient) still applies. Conferences like the London Ice Giants 
Workshop are crucial for organizing the science community and aligning our science priorities. However, all 
scientists should acknowledge the realities of Fig. 2 and a figure analogous to 7 for their own country.  
At the London Workshop an excellent address from Dr. Favio Favata about the European Space Agency (ESA) 
and its potential interest in ice giant exploration likened the relationship between ESA and NASA to a tango. 
Given the realities of Figs. 2 and 7, a more appropriate dance analogy could be a “mosh pit’ (Fig. 8), with 
many different interests jostling the dancers. To maneuver their mission to successful completion, scientists 
need to be aware of all the competing influences swaying their efforts. 
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Fig.	8.	The	dance	of	international	collaboration	in	space	missions.	While	it	takes	“just	two	to	tango”	in	
an	idealistic	vision	of	international	collaboration	(left),	in	reality	such	a	process	is	more	akin	to	a	mosh	pit	
(right).	Image	sources:	Creative	Common	Photos	of	Tango	(left)	and	a	mosh	pit	(right)	People	
Highly skilled and trained teams are a crucial component of planetary exploration. Behind every successful 
mission, there are anywhere from dozens to hundreds or even thousands of dedicated individuals, who 
together are jointly responsible for the design, build, test, and execution of a mission. 
To	Build	a	Cathedral	
For missions to the outer solar system, it takes decades to get from the initial planning to the final science. 
These timescales require a different kind of thinking by the leaders, a level of altruism and a recognition that 
they may not be building these missions for themselves, but rather for the next generation of scientists. I 
illustrate this change in thinking with the phrase “to build a cathedral” in two distinct ways. The first recounts 
the parable of the bricklayers, which in some tellings refers to the rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral (Fig. 9) by 
Christopher Wren2: 
 
2 https://sacredstructures.org/mission/the-story-of-three-bricklayers-a-parable-about-the-power-of-purpose/ 
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One day in 1671, Christopher Wren observed three bricklayers on a scaffold, one crouched, one 
half-standing and one standing tall, working very hard and fast. To the first bricklayer, Christopher 
Wren asked the question, “What are you doing?” to which the bricklayer replied, “I’m a bricklayer. 
I’m working hard laying bricks to feed my family.” The second bricklayer, responded, “I’m a 
builder. I’m building a wall.” But the third brick layer, the most productive of the three and the 
future leader of the group, when asked the question, “What are you doing?” replied with a gleam in 
his eye, “I’m a cathedral builder. I’m building a great cathedral to The Almighty.”  
 
 
Fig. 9. St Paul's Cathedral, 
London. This drawing is of the 
south elevation of the “Great 
Model” is from “A Catalogue 
of the Churches of the City of 
London; Royal Palaces; 
Hospitals; and Publick 
Edifices; Built by Sr. 
Christopher Wren Kt. 
Surveyor General of the Royal-
Works, during Fifty Years: viz. 
from 1668, to 1718.”3 
 
Fully functional outer Solar System missions are cathedrals, not individual bricks or walls or even small 
chapels. It takes strong leadership to maintain that “gleam in the eye” of all those working on the project, but 
it is crucial for mission success.  
Secondly, building outer solar system spacecraft is like cathedral building in its timescales: St. Paul’s 
rebuilding took 35 years, but it was not an anomaly: Westminster Abbey’s first major building lasted 25 years; 
Notre-Dame de Paris took about 100 years for its initial construction; and York Minster took a remarkable 252 
years to complete. That is actually longer than a Neptune year (165 years)!  
 
3 https://www.royalacademy.org.uk/art-artists/work-of-art/st-pauls-cathedral-london-south-elevation-of-the-
great-model 
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Empower	the	youth	
Given the aforementioned timescales, we must recognize that we need to nurture the next generation of 
scientists. To put this in perspective, I note that I was in elementary school when Voyager was developed; and 
in high school when Voyager launched. It flew to the outer solar system while I was in college and graduate 
school. The Neptune flyby took place when I started post-doctoral research at the Jet Propulsion Lab. We do 
not yet know which children in school today will be the scientists on our Ice Giant mission in 25 years. But 
they are the ones for whom we build this mission! 
Nurturing the next generation is challenging when there are no missions. Significant progress in telescope 
observations over the past three decades has sustained ice giant science: the remarkable capabilities of the 
Hubble Space Telescope and the power of adaptive optics at the Keck and Gemini Observatories have 
propelled our knowledge forward. Advances in computation capability have allowed reanalysis of Voyager 
data and development of sophisticated models. We now look toward the launch of James Webb Space 
Telescope, with its ability to study these systems in the near- and mid-infrared.  Ice giant observations are a 
part of my Guaranteed Time Observations with Webb, in a program led by Dr. Leigh Fletcher. Looking	to	the	Future	
The United States has initiated the process of preparing its next Decadal Survey in Planetary Science. This 
exercise gathers the community’s current understanding of the state of the art in the field, and collectively 
crafts a program of exploration for the subsequent decades.  Ice giant missions have regularly appeared in the 
past several planetary decadal reports but haven’t risen to top billing. The changing nature of planetary 
science, and its expansive growth, coupled with significant advances in technology, could mean that this is 
finally the time that an Ice Giant mission could rise to a top priority ranking.  The science yield would be 
tremendous, and our perspective on the Ice Giant systems would be irrevocably changed again, as it was more 
than 30 years ago by the Voyager 2 spacecraft.  
One final lesson is to think from the perspective of the future.  When we plan for decades in advance, we have 
to place ourselves in that future world and imagine the perspective of the future scientists. Those future 
scientists will look back fondly at the wisdom and prescience of today’s scientific community, who did not 
extrapolate from the (understandable) pessimism of the moment, and instead envisioned a different vibrant 
future of outer Solar System exploration. The scientists of the 2020s heeded Lesson 0 from Michelangelo; acted 
within the precepts of Lesson 1 to build a broad and multi-faceted consortium of supporters; developed 
innovative processes; planned wisely; and prepared the next generation of scientists for Ice Giant exploration.  
As a result, our future scientists are again exploring the skies of Neptune, the cryovolcanoes of Triton, the 
weird rings of Uranus, and the myriad moons of these distant worlds (Fig. 10).  
 
SUBMITTED 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Artist’s concept of Neptune as seen from its large moon Triton.  Used with permission from the artist, 
Michael Carroll (www.stock-space-images.com). 
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